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Abstract
Ye showed recently that the simplex method with Dantzig pivoting rule, as well as Howard’s policy
iteration algorithm, solve discounted Markov decision processes (MDPs), with a constant discount
factor, in strongly polynomial time. More precisely, Ye showed that both algorithms terminate
after at most O
(
mn
1−γ
log
(
n
1−γ
))
iterations, where n is the number of states, m is the total number of
actions in the MDP, and 0 < γ < 1 is the discount factor. We improve Ye’s analysis in two respects.
First, we improve the bound given by Ye and show that Howard’s policy iteration algorithm actually
terminates after at most O
(
m
1−γ
log
(
n
1−γ
))
iterations. Second, and more importantly, we show that
the same bound applies to the number of iterations performed by the strategy iteration (or strategy
improvement) algorithm, a generalization of Howard’s policy iteration algorithm used for solving
2-player turn-based stochastic games with discounted zero-sum rewards. This provides the first
strongly polynomial algorithm for solving these games, resolving a long standing open problem.
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1 Introduction
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are widely used in operations research, machine learning and
related disciplines, to model long-term sequential decision making in uncertain, i.e., stochastic, envi-
ronments. Stochastic Games (SGs), a generalization of MDPs to a 2-player setting, are widely used
to model long-term sequential decision making in stochastic and adversarial environments. MDPs
were first introduced by Bellman [2]. SGs, which form a more general model, were introduced slightly
earlier by Shapley [32]. Many variants of MDPs and SGs were studied in the literature. The MDPs
and SGs considered in this paper are infinite-horizon discounted MDPs/SGs. The SGs we consider
are turn-based and we thus refer to them as 2-player Turn-Based Stochastic Games (2TBSG).
MDPs may be viewed as degenerate 2TBSGs in which one of the players has no influence on the
game. For a thorough treatment of MDPs and their numerous practical applications, see the books
of Howard [18], Derman [9], Puterman [29] and Bertsekas [3]. For a similar treatment of SGs, see the
books of Filar and Vrieze [13] and Neyman and Sorin [28].
A 2TBSGs is composed of a finite set of states and a finite set of actions. Each state is controlled
by one of the players. In each time unit, the game is in exactly one of the states. Each state has
a non-empty set of actions associated with it. The player controlling the state must play one of
these actions. Playing an action incurs an immediate cost, and results in a probabilistic transition
to a new state according to a probability distribution that depends on the action. The process goes
on indefinitely. The first player tries to minimize the total expected discounted cost of the infinite
sequence of actions taken, with respect to a fixed discount factor. The second player tries to maximize
this total discounted cost. Discounting captures the fact that a cost incurred at a later stage has a
smaller effect than the same cost incurred at an earlier stage. For formal definitions, see Section 2.
A policy or a strategy for a player is a possibly probabilistic rule that specifies the action to be taken
in each situation, given the full history of play so far. One of the fundamental results in the theory
of MDPs and 2TBSGs, is that both players have positional optimal strategies. A positional strategy
is a strategy that is both deterministic and memoryless. A memoryless strategy is a strategy that
depends only on the current state, and not on the full history. MDPs and 2TBSGs are solved by
finding optimal positional strategies for the players.
MDPs can be solved using linear programming (d’Epenoux [8], Derman [9]). The preferred way of
solving MDPs in practice, however, is Howard’s [18] Policy Iteration algorithm. The policy iteration
algorithm maintains and iteratively improves a policy by performing “obvious” improving switches
(for details, see Section 5). Howard’s algorithm may be viewed as a parallel version of the simplex
algorithm in which several pivoting steps are performed simultaneously. The problem of determining
the worst case complexity of Howard’s algorithm was stated explicitly at least 25 years ago. (It is men-
tioned, among other places, in Schmitz [31], Littman et al. [23] and Mansour and Singh [25].) Meister
and Holzbaur [27] established, decades ago, that the number of iterations performed by Howard’s al-
gorithm, when the discount factor is fixed, is polynomially bounded in the bit size of the input. Their
bound, however, is not polynomial in the number of states and actions of the MDP. The first strongly
polynomial time algorithm for solving MDPs was an interior point algorithm of Ye [34].
Very recently, Ye [35] presented a surprisingly simple proof that Howard’s algorithm terminates after
at most O
(
mn
1−γ log
(
n
1−γ
))
iterations, where n is the number of states, m is the total number of actions,
and 0 < γ < 1 is the discount factor. In particular, when the discount factor is constant, the number of
iterations is O(mn log n). Since each iteration only involves solving a system of linear equations, Ye’s
result established for the first time that Howard’s algorithm is a strongly polynomial time algorithm,
when the discount factor is constant. Ye’s proof is based on a careful analysis of an LP formulation
of the MDP problem, with LP duality and complementary slackness playing crucial roles.
We significantly improve and extend Ye’s [35] analysis. We show that Howard’s algorithm actually
terminates after at most O
(
m
1−γ log
(
n
1−γ
))
iterations, improving Ye’s bound by a factor of n. In-
terestingly, the only added ingredient needed to obtain this significant improvement is a well-known
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relationship between Howard’s policy iteration algorithm and Bellman’s [2] value iteration algorithm,
an algorithm for approximating the values of MDPs.
More significantly, and more surprisingly, we are able to obtain the same O
(
m
1−γ log
(
n
1−γ
))
bound
also for the Strategy Iteration (or Strategy Improvement) algorithm for the solution of 2TBSGs. This
supplies the first strongly polynomial algorithm for solving 2TBSGs, with a fixed discount factor,
solving a long standing open problem.
The strategy iteration algorithm is a natural generalization of Howard’s policy iteration algorithm
that can be used to solve 2TBSGs. The strategy iteration algorithm for discounted 2-player games
is apparently first described by Rao et al. [30]. Hoffman and Karp [17] earlier described a related
algorithm for a somewhat different class of SGs.
Prior to our strongly polynomial bound for the strategy iteration algorithm, the best time available
on the problem of solving discounted 2TBSGs was a polynomial, but not strongly polynomial, bound
of Littman [22], obtained essentially using value iteration. The best time bound expressed solely in
terms of the number states and actions was a subexponential bound of Ludwig [24]. (See also Bjo¨rklund
and Vorobyov [4, 5] and Halman [16].) Interestingly, these subexponential bounds are obtained using
randomized variants of the strategy iteration algorithm that mimic the combinatorial subexponential
algorithms of Kalai [20, 21] and Matousˇek, Sharir and Welzl [26] for solving LP-type problems.
What makes our analysis of the strategy iteration algorithm surprising is the fact that Ye’s analysis
relies heavily on the LP formulation of MDPs. In contrast, no succinct LP formulation is known
for 2TBSGs. (Natural attempts fail. See Condon [7].) Our proof is based on finding natural game-
theoretic quantities that correspond to the LP-based quantities used by Ye, and by reestablishing, via
direct means, (improved versions) of the bounds obtained by Ye using LP duality.
Ye’s [35] results and our results, combined with the recent results of Friedmann [14] and Fearnley [12],
supply a complete characterization of the complexity of the policy/strategy iteration algorithm for
MDPs/2TBSGs. The policy/strategy iteration algorithms are strongly polynomial for a fixed discount
factor, but exponential for non-discounted problems, or when the discount factor is part of the input.
(In non-discounted problems the discounting criteria is replaced by limiting average criteria. In a
sense, this is equivalent to letting the discount factor tend to 1. See, e.g., Derman [9].)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the 2-player turn-based stochastic
games (2TBSG) studied in this paper. In Sections 3, 4 and 5 we summarize known results regarding
these games. For completeness, these sections contain concise, but complete, proofs of all results.
(The proofs in these three sections are not the innovative part of this paper and may be skipped
at first reading.) Finally, in Section 6 we obtain our innovative strongly polynomial bound on the
complexity of the celebrated strategy iteration algorithm, solving a long-standing open problem. We
end in Section 7 with some concluding remarks and open problems.
2 2-player turn-based stochastic games
Discounted stochastic games were first studied by Shapley [32]. In his games, the players perform
simultaneous, or concurrent, actions. We consider the subclass of turn-based stochastic games.
We briefly review the informal definition of 2-Player Turn-Based Stochastic Games (2TBSGs), before
giving a formal definition. A game is composed of states and actions. It starts at some initial state
and proceeds, in discrete steps, indefinitely. In each time step one of the players plays an action. (The
game is thus a turn-based or perfect information game.) Each action has a cost associated with it.
This is the cost paid by player 1 to player 2 when this action is played. (The game is therefore a
zero-sum game.) Each action also has a probability distribution on states associated with it. The next
state, after playing a particular action, is chosen randomly according to this probability distribution.
(The game is, in general, stochastic.) Finally, the game is discounted. The first player tries to minimize
the expected total discounted cost, while the second player tries to maximize it.
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Definition 2.1 (Actions). An action a over a set of states S is composed of a triplet (s(a), p(a), c(a)),
where s(a) ∈ S is the state from which a can be played, p(a) ∈ ∆(S) is a probability distribution over
states according to which the next state is chosen when a is played, and c(a) ∈ R is the cost of a.
Definition 2.2 (2-Player Turn-Based Stochastic Games). A 2-Player Turn-Based (Discounted)
Stochastic Game (2TBSG) is a tuple G = (S1, S2, A, γ), where S1 and S2 are the set of states controlled
by players 1 and 2, respectively, and A is a set of actions. We assume that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and let
S = S1 ∪ S2. For every i ∈ S, we let Ai = {a ∈ A | s(a) = i} be the set of actions that can be played
from i. We assume that Ai 6= ∅, for every i ∈ S. We let A
1 = ∪i∈S1Ai and A
2 = ∪i∈S2Ai be the
sets of all actions that can be played by players 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, 0 < γ < 1 is a fixed
discount factor. If the infinite sequence of actions taken by the two players is a0, a1, . . ., then the total
discounted cost of this action sequence is
∑
k≥0 γ
kc(ak).
If one of the players has only a single action available from each state under her control, the game
degenerates into a 1-player game known as a Markov Decision Process. (This happens, in particular,
when S1 = ∅ or S2 = ∅.)
We next define the probability and action matrices of 2TBSGs. These matrices provide a compact
representation of 2TBSGs that greatly simplifies their manipulation. Throughout the paper, we use
n = |S| and m = |A| to denote the number of states and actions, respectively, in a game.
Definition 2.3 (Probability and action matrices). Let G = (S1, S2, A, γ) be a 2TBSG. We
assume, without loss of generality, that S = S1 ∪ S2 = [n] and A = [m]. We let P ∈ R
m×n, where
Pa,i = p(a)i is the probability of ending up in state i after taking action a, for every a ∈ A = [m] and
i ∈ S = [n], be the probability matrix of the game, and c ∈ Rm, where ca = c(a) is the cost of action
a ∈ A = [m], be its cost vector. We also let J ∈ Rm×n be a matrix such that Ja,i = 1 if and only if
a ∈ Ai, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we let Q = J − γP be the action matrix of G.
It is interesting to note that a 2TBSG is fully specified by its action matrix Q = J − γP , its cost
vector c, and the partition of S = [n] into S1 and S2. (Action matrices may be thought of as a
stochastic and discounted generalization of the incidence matrices of directed graphs.)
Definition 2.4 (Strategies, strategy profiles). A (positional) strategy pij for player j, is a mapping
pij : Sj → A such that pij(i) ∈ Ai, for every i ∈ Sj. We say that player j uses strategy pij if whenever
the game is in state i, player j chooses action pij(i). A strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2) is simply a pair
of strategies for the two players. We let Πj = Πj(G), for j ∈ {1, 2}, be the set of all strategies of
player j, and let Π = Π(G) = Π1 ×Π2 be the set of all strategy profiles in G.
We note that a strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2) may be viewed as a mapping pi : S → A, i.e., as a
strategy in a 1-player version of the game. All strategies considered in this paper are positional.
When convenient, we also view a strategy pij or a strategy profile pi as subsets pij(S), pi(S) ⊆ A. A
strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2), when viewed as a subset of A, is simply the union pi1 ∪ pi2. We let
Ppi ∈ R
n×n be the matrix obtained by selecting the rows of P whose indices belong to pi. Note that Ppi
is a (row) stochastic matrix. Its elements are non-negative and the elements in each row sum to 1.
Similarly, cpi ∈ R
n is the vector containing the costs of the actions that belong to pi. We conveniently
have Jpi = I and Qpi = I − γPpi, for every strategy profile pi.
Definition 2.5 (Value vectors). For every strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π, we let vpi = vpi1,pi2 ∈ R
n
be a vector such that (vpi)i, for every i ∈ S, is the expected total discounted cost when the game starts
at state i, player 1 uses strategy pi1, and player 2 uses strategy pi2.
Given two vectors u,v ∈ Rn, we say that u ≤ v if and only if ui ≤ vi, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We say
that u < v if and only if u ≤ v and u 6= v.
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Definition 2.6 (Optimal counter strategies). Let G be a 2TBSG and let pi2 ∈ Π2(G) be a strategy
of player 2. A strategy pi1 for player 1 is said to be an optimal counter-strategy against pi2, if and
only if vpi1,pi2 ≤ vpi′
1
,pi2, for every pi
′
1 ∈ Π1(G). Similarly, a strategy pi2 for player 2 is said to be
an optimal counter-strategy against pi1, if and only if vpi1,pi2 ≥ vpi1,pi′2, for every pi
′
2 ∈ Π2(G). For
every pi1 ∈ Π1(G), we let τ2(pi1) be an optimal counter strategy against pi1, if one exists. For every
pi2 ∈ Π2(G), we let τ1(pi2) be an optimal counter strategy against pi2, if one exists.
It is not immediately clear that optimal counter strategies always exist. (Note, that vpi1,pi2 ≤ vpi′1,pi2
and vpi1,pi2 ≥ vpi1,pi′2 are vector inequalities. As defined, optimal counter strategies need to be optimal
for every initial state.) Furthermore, optimal counter strategies, if they exist, need not be unique. It
is well known, however, that optimal counter strategies do always exist, as we shall also show below.
In a two-player zero-sum game, an optimal strategy is by definition one that secures the best possible
guarantee on the expected payoff against any opponent. As with finite games, pairs of optimal strate-
gies in a zero-sum stochastic game coincide with the Nash equilibria of the game. This was established
by Shapley [32]. For brevity, we take this characterization to be the definition of an optimal strategy.
Definition 2.7 (Optimal strategies). A strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π(G) is said to be optimal
if and only if pi1 is an optimal counter strategy against pi2, and pi2 is an optimal counter strategy
against pi1. In such a case we also say that pi1 is an optimal strategy for player 1 and that pi2 is an
optimal strategy for player 2.
Shapley [32] also established the following theorem.
Theorem 2.8. Every 2TBSG has an optimal strategy profile. If pi and pi′ are two optimal strategy
profiles then vpi = vpi′ .
Theorem 2.8 immediately implies the existence of optimal counter strategies against any strategy. It
is easy to see that pi1 is an optimal strategy for player 1 if and only if vpi1,τ2(pi1) ≤ vpi′1,τ2(pi′1), for every
pi′1 ∈ Π1. An analogous condition clearly holds for player 2. The main result of this paper is a proof
that a pair of optimal strategies can be computed in strongly polynomial time, when the discount
factor is constant.
3 Basic results
For any strategy profile pi, the matrix (I − γPpi) plays a prominent role in the sequel. (Recall that Ppi
is the matrix obtained by selecting the rows of P that correspond to actions that belong to pi.) We
thus start with the following lemma whose trivial proof is omitted.
Lemma 3.1. For any strategy profile pi, the matrix (I − γPpi) is invertible and
(I − γPpi)
−1 =
∑
k≥0
(γPpi)
k.
All entries of (I − γPpi)
−1 are non-negative and the entries on the diagonal are strictly positive.
Lemma 3.2. For every strategy profile pi ∈ Π and every 0 < γ < 1, we have
vpi = (I − γPpi)
−1cpi.
Proof. When the players use the strategy profile pi, the process becomes a Markov chain with rewards
with transition matrix Ppi. In particular, for every i, j ∈ [n] and every k ≥ 0, (P
k
pi )i,j is the probability
that a game that starts at state i is in state j after exactly k steps. The expected total discounted
costs, starting from all states are thus
vpi =
(∑
k≥0
(γkP kpi )
)
cpi = (I − γPpi)
−1cpi.
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Definition 3.3 (Modified costs). The modified cost vector cpi ∈ Rm corresponding to a strategy
profile pi is defined to be
cpi = c− (J − γP )vpi.
The modified cost vector cpi is obtained from c via a potential transformation that uses vpi as a vector
of potentials. (If h : V → R is a function assigning potentials to the states, then the modified cost ch(a)
is defined as ch(a) = c(a) − h(a) + γ
∑
j∈S p(a)jh(j).)
It is important to stress the difference between cpi ∈ Rn, the vector obtained by selecting the entries
of c corresponding to strategy profile pi, and the modified cost vector cpi = c − (J − γP )vpi ∈ R
m of
Definition 3.3. (This distinction may be confusing at first, but it is extremely useful.)
We let 0 be an all zero vector. (The dimension of 0 will depend on the context.) Using Lemma 3.2
we immediately get the following basic but important relation.
Lemma 3.4. For every strategy profile pi we have (cpi)pi = 0.
Definition 3.5 (Modified value vectors). For every two strategy profiles pi, pi′, we let vpipi′ be the
value vector of pi′ corresponding to the modified cost vector cpi.
Lemma 3.6. For every two strategy profiles pi′, pi we have
vpipi′ = vpi′ − vpi.
Proof. By Definition 3.3 and Lemma 3.2 we have
vpipi′ = (I − γPpi′)
−1(cpi)pi′
= (I − γPpi′)
−1(cpi′ − (I − γPpi′)vpi)
= vpi′ − vpi.
Recall that A1 = ∪i∈S1Ai and A
2 = ∪i∈S2Ai.
Lemma 3.7. (Optimality condition) A strategy profile pi is optimal iff (cpi)A1 ≥ 0 and (c
pi)A2 ≤ 0.
Proof. Suppose that (cpi)A1 ≥ 0 and (c
pi)A2 ≤ 0. Let pi = (pi1, pi2). We prove that pi1 is an optimal
counter strategy against pi2. By Lemma 3.4 we have (c
pi)pi1 = 0, (c
pi)pi2 = 0 and hence v
pi
pi1,pi2 = 0.
For every pi′1 ∈ Π1, we have (c
pi)pi′
1
≥ 0, as pi′1 ⊆ A
1, and hence (cpi)pi′
1
,pi2 ≥ 0. Thus clearly v
pi
pi′
1
,pi2
≥
0 = vpipi1,pi2, and pi1 is indeed an optimal counter strategy against pi2. The proof that pi2 is an optimal
counter strategy against pi1 is analogous.
Suppose now that there is an action a ∈ Ai0 , where i0 ∈ S1, such that (c
pi)a < 0. (The case in which
i0 ∈ S2 and (c
pi)a > 0 is analogous.) Again, let pi = (pi1, pi2). Let pi
′
1 ∈ Π1 be a policy such that
pi′1(i) = pi1(i), if i 6= i0, and pi
′
1(i0) = a. We then have (c
pi)pi′
1
< 0 and (cpi)pi2 = 0. Thus v
pi
pi′
1
,pi2
< 0.
(The strict inequality follows from Lemma 3.1. All entries of (I−γPpi′
1
,pi2)
−1 are non-negative, and the
entries on the diagonal are strictly positive.) Thus pi1 is not an optimal counter strategy against pi2.
In the second part of the proof above, pi′1 is obtained from pi1 by a profitable switch. Profitable switches
are closely related to the pivoting steps performed by the simplex algorithm. They also lie at the core
of the strategy iteration algorithm whose analysis is the main focus of this paper.
Definition 3.8 (Flux vectors). For every strategy profile pi, let xpi ∈ R
1×n be a row vector such
that (xpi)i, for every i ∈ S, is the sum of the discounted costs, over all states, when the cost of
action pi(i) is 1, while the cost of all other actions is 0, and when the players use strategy profile pi.
We let e = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rn be an all one vector. Using Lemma 3.2, we easily get
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Lemma 3.9. For every strategy profile pi, we have
xpi = e
T (I − γPpi)
−1.
It is in fact possible to view Lemma 3.9 as the definition of xpi. The meaning of the flux vectors given
in Definition 3.8 is not used in the sequel. (The flux vectors are intimately related to the dual linear
program formulation of MDPs.)
Lemma 3.10. For every strategy profile pi, we have
xpie =
n
1− γ
.
Proof. By Lemma 3.9, Lemma 3.1, and the fact that eT (Ppi)
ke = n, for every k ≥ 0, we have:
xpie = e
T (I − γPpi)
−1e =
∑
k≥0
eT (γPpi)
ke = n
∑
k≥0
γk =
n
1− γ
.
Lemma 3.11. For every strategy profile pi, we have
eTvpi = xpicpi.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 and then Lemma 3.9, we get eTvpi = e
T (I − γPpi)
−1cpi = xpicpi.
Lemma 3.12. For every strategy profile pi, we have
eT (vpi′ − vpi) = xpi′(c
pi)pi′ .
Proof. By Lemma 3.6 and then Lemma 3.11, we have eT (vpi′ − vpi) = e
Tvpipi′ = xpi′(c
pi)pi′ .
4 Value iteration
If x ∈ Rm and B ⊆ [m], we let minB x = minj∈B xj , and similarly maxB x = maxj∈B xj. We also let
argminB x = argminj∈B xj and argmaxB x = argmaxj∈B xj .
Definition 4.1 (Value iteration operator). The value iteration operator T : Rn → Rn is defined
as follows:
(T v)i =
{
minAi c+ γPv , if i ∈ S1,
maxAi c+ γPv , if i ∈ S2.
The operator T is a contraction with Lipschitz constant γ.
Lemma 4.2. For every u,v ∈ Rn we have ‖T u− T v‖∞ ≤ γ ‖u− v‖∞.
Proof. Assume that i ∈ S1 and that (T u)i ≥ (T v)i. (The other cases are analogous.) Let a =
argminAi c+ γPu and b = argminAi c+ γPv. Then,
(T u− T v)i = (ca + γPau)− (cb + γPbv)
≤ (cb + γPbu)− (cb + γPbv)
= γPb(u− v)
≤ γ ‖u− v‖∞.
The last inequality follows from the fact that the elements in Pb are non-negative and sum-up to 1.
Banach fixed point theorem now implies that the value iteration operator T has a unique fixed point.
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Corollary 4.3. There is a unique vector v∗ ∈ Rn such that T v∗ = v∗.
We next define the strategy extraction operators that play an important role in this section, and the
central role in the next section.
Definition 4.4 (Strategy extraction operators). The strategy extraction operators P1 : R
n → Π1
and P2 : R
n → Π2 and P : R
n → Π are defined as follows:
(P1v)(i) = argminAi c+ γPv , i ∈ S1,
(P2v)(i) = argmaxAi c+ γPv , i ∈ S2.
and
Pv = (P1v,P2v).
The following relation between the value iteration and strategy extraction operator is immediate.
Lemma 4.5. For every v ∈ Rn we have T v = (c+ γPv)pi, where pi = Pv.
The following simple lemma provides an interesting relation between the strategy extraction operator
and modified cost vectors.
Lemma 4.6. For every strategy profile pi we have
(P1vpi)(i) = argminAi c
pi , i ∈ S1,
(P2vpi)(i) = argmaxAi c
pi , i ∈ S2.
Proof. Let v = vpi. If a ∈ Ai then,
(cpi)a = ca − (vi − γPav) = (c+ γPv)a − vi.
Thus, if a, a′ ∈ Ai, then (c+ γPv)a ≤ (c+ γPv)a′ if and only if (c
pi)a ≤ (c
pi)a′ .
The following lemma supplies a simple proof of Theorem 2.8. (This is, in fact, the original proof given
by Shapley [32].)
Lemma 4.7. Let v∗ ∈ Rn be the unique fixed point of T and let pi = Pv∗. Then, pi is an optimal
strategy profile.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, we get that v∗ = T v∗ = cpi + γPpiv
∗. By Lemma 3.2 we get vpi = v
∗. We next
show that pi satisfies the optimality condition of Lemma 3.7, and hence is an optimal strategy profile.
Suppose that i ∈ S1 and that a ∈ Ai. By Lemma 4.6, we have pi(i) = (P1v
∗)(i) = argminAi c
pi. As
(cpi)pi(i) = 0, we get that (c
pi)a ≥ 0. Similarly, if i ∈ S2 and a ∈ Ai, we get that (c
pi)a ≤ 0.
The value iteration algorithm, given on the left-hand side of Figure 1, repeatedly applies the value
iteration operator T to an initial vector u0 ∈ Rn, generating a sequence of vectors (uk)Nk=0, where
uk+1 = T uk, until the difference between two successive vectors is small enough, i.e., ‖uk−1−uk‖∞ < .
Lemma 4.8. Let (uk)Nk=0 be the sequence of value vectors generated by a call Value-Iteration(u
0, ),
for some  > 0. Let v∗ be the optimal value vector. Then, for every 0 ≤ k ≤ N we have
‖uk − v∗‖∞ ≤ γ
k ‖u0 − v∗‖∞.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2 and the fact that T v∗ = v∗, we have
‖uk − v∗‖∞ = ‖T u
k−1 − T v∗‖∞ ≤ γ ‖u
k−1 − v∗‖∞.
The claim follows easily by induction.
It follows immediately from Lemma 4.8, that for any u ∈ Rn, the infinite sequence of vectors generated
by the call Value-Iteration(u0, 0) converges to the optimal value vector v∗. Also, for every  > 0,
the call Value-Iteration(u0, ) eventually terminates.
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Function Value-Iteration(u0, )
k ← 0
repeat
uk+1 ← T uk
k ← k + 1
until ‖uk−1 − uk‖∞ < 
return uk
Function Strategy-Iteration(σ0)
k ← 0
repeat
τk = τ2(σ
k)
vk ← vσk ,τk
σk+1 ← P1v
k (if possible σk+1 ← σk)
k ← k + 1
until σk−1 = σk
return σk
Figure 1: The Value-Iteration and Strategy-Iteration algorithms.
5 Strategy iteration
The strategy iteration algorithm is given in the right-hand side of Figure 1. It was first described for
the MDP case by Howard [18] and is called policy iteration or Howard’s algorithm in that context. It
was described for 2-player stochastic games by Rao et al. [30]. (Their algorithm actually works on
more general imperfect information games for which it is a non-terminating approximation algorithm.)
The strategy iteration algorithm receives an initial strategy σ0 of player 1, and generates a sequence
pik = (σk, τk) of strategy profiles of the two players, ending with an optimal strategy profile. Each
iteration of the algorithm receives a strategy σk and produces an improved strategy σk+1 as follows.
The algorithm first computes an optimal counter-strategy τk = τ2(σ
k) for player 2 against σk. (We
assume here that this can be done in strongly polynomial time. One way of doing it is to apply
the strategy iteration algorithm on a restricted game in which σk is the only strategy available to
player 1.) Next, it evaluates the strategy profile pik = (σk, τk), by solving a system of linear equations,
and obtains its value vector vk = vpik . It then lets σ
k+1 = P1vpik . Ties are broken, if possible, in favor
of actions that are in σk. (This is important, as termination is not guaranteed without this provision.)
The algorithm terminates when two consecutive strategies σk and σk+1 are identical.
The step σk+1 = P1vpik is the main step of the strategy iteration algorithm. As we shall (implicitly)
see below, σk+1 is obtained from σk by performing a collection of improving switches.
To prove the correctness of the Strategy-Iteration algorithm we use the following lemma. (Note
that pi1 in the lemma is obtained from pi0 using one iteration of the Strategy-Iteration algorithm.)
Lemma 5.1. Let σ0 ∈ Π1, pi
0 = (σ0, τ2(σ
0)) and σ1 = P1vpi0 , pi
1 = (σ1, τ2(σ
1)). Then vpi0 ≥ vpi1 .
Proof. We show that vpi
0
pi0 = 0 ≥ v
pi0
pi1 , which by Lemma 3.6 implies that vpi0 ≥ vpi1 . To show that
vpi
0
pi1 ≤ 0, we show that (c
pi0)pi1 ≤ 0. The fact that (c
pi0)σ1 ≤ 0 follows from the fact that for every
i ∈ S1 we have σ
1(i) = argminAi c
pi0 and hence (cpi
0
)σ1(i) ≤ (c
pi0)σ0(i) = 0. The fact that (c
pi0)τ1 ≤ 0
follows from fact that τ0 is an optimal counter strategy against σ0, so in fact (cpi
0
)A2 ≤ 0.
Lemma 5.2. For every initial strategy σ0, Strategy-Iteration(σ0) terminates after a finite number
of iterations. If (vk)Nk=0 is the sequence of value vectors generated by the call, then, v
k−1 > vk ≥ v∗,
for every 1 ≤ k < N . Furthermore, vN−1 = vN = v∗ and piN−1 = piN is an optimal strategy profile.
Proof. The claim vk−1 ≥ vk, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ N follows easily from Lemma 5.1 by induction. Next,
we note that if vk−1 = vk, for some k, then by the reasoning used in the proof of Lemma 5.1, we
must have (cpi
k−1
)A1 ≥ 0 and (c
pik−1)A2 ≤ 0. By the optimality condition, we get that pi
k−1 is an
optimal strategy profile. By the tie breaking mechanism used, we also get that pik = pik−1. Finally,
the fact that vk−1 > vk, for every 1 ≤ k < N , implies that strategy profiles encountered cannot
repeat themselves. As there is only a finite number of such profiles, the sequence of strategy profiles
generated must be finite.
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We next relate the sequences of value vectors obtained by running Strategy-Iteration(σ0) and
Value-Iteration(vpi0 , ), where pi
0 = (σ0, τ2(σ
0)). The following lemmas for the case of MDPs
are well-known and appear, e.g., in Meister and Holzbaur [27]. The proofs for the 2-player case are
essentially identical. (They may be folklore.)
Lemma 5.3. Let σ0 ∈ Π1, pi
0 = (σ0, τ2(σ
0)), and σ1 = P1vpi0 , pi
1 = (σ1, τ2(σ
1)). Then T vpi0 ≥ vpi1.
Proof. Let i ∈ S1. As σ
1(i) = argminAi c+ γPvpi0 , vpi0 ≥ vpi1 , and cpi1 + γPpi1vpi1 = vpi1 , we have
(T vpi0)i = minAi c+ γPvpi0 = (c+ γPvpi0)σ1(i) ≥ (c+ γPvpi1)σ1(i) = (vpi1)i.
Similarly, if i ∈ S2, then
(T vpi0)i = maxAi c+ γPvpi0 ≥ (c+ γPvpi0)τ1(i) ≥ (c+ γPvpi1)τ1(i) = (vpi1)i.
Using Lemma 5.3, we immediately get:
Lemma 5.4. Let (vk)Nk=0 be the value vectors generated by Strategy-Iteration(σ
0), and let (uk)∞k=0
be the value vectors generated by Value-Iteration(vpi0 , 0), where pi
0 = (σ0, τ2(σ
0)). Then, vk ≤ uk,
for every 0 ≤ k ≤ N .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. We have v0 = u0. Suppose now that vk ≤ uk. Then, by
Lemma 5.3 and the monotonicity of the value iteration operator, we have:
vk+1 ≤ T vk ≤ T uk = uk+1.
Combining Lemmas 4.8 and 5.4, we get
Lemma 5.5. Let (vk)Nk=0 be the sequence of value vectors generated by Strategy-Iteration(σ
0),
for some σ0 ∈ Π1. Let v
∗ be the optimal value vector. Then, for every 0 ≤ k ≤ N we have
‖vk − v∗‖∞ ≤ γ
k ‖v0 − v∗‖∞.
6 Strongly polynomial bound
In this section, the main section of the paper, we present our strongly polynomial bound on the number
of iterations performed by the strategy iteration algorithm. We begin with some technical lemmas.
Lemma 6.1. Let pi′, pi be two strategy profiles such that vpi′ ≥ vpi and let a = pi
′(i) where i ∈ S. Then,
(vpi′ − vpi)i ≥ (c
pi)a.
Proof. (vpi′)i − (vpi)i = (c+ γPvpi′)a − (vpi)i ≥ (c+ γPvpi)a − (vpi)i = (c
pi)a.
Lemma 6.2. Let pi′′, pi be two strategy profiles such that vpi′′ ≥ vpi and let a = argmaxpi′′ c
pi. Then,
‖vpi′′ − vpi‖1 ≤
n
1− γ
(cpi)a.
Proof. As vpi′′ ≥ vpi, we get using Lemma 3.12 and then Lemma 3.10 that
‖vpi′′ − vpi‖1 = e
T (vpi′′ − vpi) = xpi′′(c
pi)pi′′ ≤ xpi′′e (c
pi)a =
n
1− γ
(cpi)a.
Lemma 6.3. Let pi′′, pi′, pi be three strategy profiles such that vpi′′ ≥ vpi′ ≥ vpi. Let a = argmaxpi′′ c
pi
and suppose that a ∈ pi′. Then,
‖vpi′ − vpi‖1 ≥
1− γ
n
‖vpi′′ − vpi‖1.
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Proof. Let i ∈ S be the state for which pi′′(i) = pi′(i) = a. By Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 we get
‖vpi′ − vpi‖1 ≥ (vpi′ − vpi)i ≥ (c
pi)a ≥
1− γ
n
‖vpi′′ − vpi‖1.
Lemma 6.4. Let (σk)Nk=0 be the sequence of player 1 strategies generated by the Strategy-Iteration
algorithm, starting from some initial strategy σ0. Let L = log 1/γ
n2
1−γ . Then, every strategy σ
k contains
an action that does not appear in any strategy σ`, where k + L < ` ≤ N .
Proof. Let (pik)Nk=0, where pi
k = (σk, τk), be the sequence of strategy profiles generated by the strategy
iteration algorithm. By the correctness of the strategy iteration algorithm, pi∗ = piN is composed of
optimal strategies for the two players. Let a = argmaxpik c
pi∗ . By Lemma 3.7, we have (cpi
∗
)a ≥ 0
for every a ∈ A1, and (cpi
∗
)a ≤ 0 for every a ∈ A
2. We may assume, therefore, that a ∈ A1, i.e.,
that a is an action controlled by player 1. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that a ∈ pi`, for some
k + L < ` ≤ N . Using Lemma 6.3, with pi′′ = pik, pi′ = pi` and pi = pi∗, we get that
‖vpi` − vpi∗‖1 ≥
1− γ
n
‖vpik − vpi∗‖1.
On the other hand, using Lemma 5.5, we get that
‖vpi` − vpi∗‖∞ ≤ γ
`−k‖vpik − vpi∗‖∞.
Thus,
‖vpi` − vpi∗‖1 ≤ n ‖vpi` − vpi∗‖∞ ≤ nγ
`−k ‖vpik − vpi∗‖∞ ≤ nγ
`−k ‖vpik − vpi∗‖1.
It follows that nγ`−k ≥ 1−γn and hence
γL > γ`−k ≥
1− γ
n2
,
a contradiction.
Theorem 6.5. The Strategy-Iteration algorithm, starting from any initial strategy, terminates
with an optimal strategy after at most (m+ 1)(1 + log 1/γ
n2
1−γ ) = O(
m
1−γ log
n
1−γ ) iterations.
Proof. Let L¯ = b1+log 1/γ
n2
1−γ c. Consider strategies σ
0, σL¯, σ2L¯, . . .. By Lemma 6.4, every strategy in
this subsequence contains a new action that would never be used again. As there are only m actions,
the total number of strategies in the sequence is at most (m+1)L¯ = (m+1)(1+ log 1/γ
n2
1−γ ). Finally,
note that log 1/γ x =
log x
log 1/γ ≤
x
1−γ .
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the strategy iteration algorithm is strongly polynomial for 2TBSGs with a fixed
discount factor. Friedmann [14], on the other hand, has recently shown that the strategy iteration
algorithm is exponential for non-discounted 2TBSG, or when the discount factor is part of the input.
The existence of polynomial time algorithms for 2TBSGs when the discount factor is part of the
input, or for the non-discounted case, remains an intriguing and a challenging open problem, with
many possible consequences for complexity theory and automatic verification. As shown by Andersson
and Miltersen [1], this is equivalent to finding a polynomial time algorithm for Condon’s [6] Simple
Stochastic Games (SSGs). Such an algorithm will immediately provide polynomial time algorithms
for Mean Payoff Games (MPGs) (see [10],[15],[36]) and Parity Games (PGs) (see, e.g., [11], [33], [19]).
We believe that our results give some hope of obtaining a polynomial time algorithm for this problem.
In an earlier work, Ye [34] gave a polynomial time algorithm for the analogous MDP problem. His
algorithm uses interior point methods and its analysis relies again on the LP formulation of the MDP
problem. Given the “deLPfication” of Ye’s [35] analysis of the policy iteration algorithm carried out
here, one could speculate that looking at interior point methods for the two-player case, with Ye’s [34]
algorithm for MDPs as a starting point, would be a fertile approach.
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